

# A Dynamic Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM

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# 1 Plan of Talk

- Motivation
- A Static Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM
  - Heterogeneous Beliefs and Consensus Belief
  - Equilibrium Return Relation, Betas, and Equilibrium Prices
- A Dynamic Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM
  - Market fractions
  - Equilibrium Return Relation, Dynamic Beta, and Equilibrium Price
- A numerical example
  - Fundamentalists, trend followers and noise traders
  - Equilibrium returns, dynamic betas and Sharpe ratios
- Some Conclusions

## 2 Motivation

- Heterogeneous agent literature becoming well developed recently (e.g. Brock and Hommes, Lux and Marchesi)
  - Typically one risky/ one risk free asset framework.
  - Focus on patterns of price and return dynamics.
- Much less work on multiple assets and portfolio considerations
  - See Böhm and Wenzelburger; Chiarella, Dieci and He; Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini
- The effect of heterogeneity on CAPM little studied
  - See Lintner(1969)
- Aim of this paper is to study effect of heterogeneity on CAPM, taking dynamic feedback into consideration.

## 3 Heterogeneous Beliefs CAPM—A Static Model

### 3.1 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Consensus Belief

- **Market:** one risk-free asset ( $r_f$ ) and  $N$  risky assets ( $\tilde{r}_j, j = 1, 2, \dots, N$ ).
- **Heterogeneous Beliefs**
  - Some of the ideas go back to Lintner (1969).
  - Assume  $\tilde{r}_j \sim MVN$
  - Heterogeneous beliefs  $\mathcal{B}_i$  defined by  $\mathcal{B}_i(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) = (\mathbb{E}_i(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}), \Omega_i = Cov_i(\tilde{r}_k, \tilde{r}_l))$ .
- **Optimal Portfolio:**
  - Investor  $i$  has a concave utility of wealth function  $u_i(\cdot)$ .
  - Portfolio wealth:  $\tilde{W}_i = W_0^i(1 + r_f + w^T(\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}))$

- The global absolute risk aversion:

$$\theta_i := -E_i \left[ u_i''(\widetilde{W}_i) \right] / E_i \left[ u_i'(\widetilde{W}_i) \right]$$

- The optimal portfolio of investor  $i$ :

$$\mathbf{w}_i = \frac{\theta_i^{-1}}{W_0^i} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i [\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}] .$$

- **Aggregation:**

- Aggregate wealth

$$\sum_{i=1}^I W_0^i \mathbf{w}_i = \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i [\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- The vector of the *aggregate wealth proportions* in the risky assets

$$\mathbf{w}_a = \frac{1}{W_{m0}} \sum_{i=1}^I W_0^i \mathbf{w}_i = \frac{1}{W_{m0}} \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i [\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- **Consensus Belief:**  $\mathcal{B}_a = \{\mathbb{E}_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}), \Omega_a\}$

- Aggregate risk aversion:  $\Theta := \left( \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \right)^{-1}$ .

- An “aggregate” variance/covariance matrix  $\Omega_a$  can be defined as

$$\Omega_a^{-1} = \Theta \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1}.$$

- The “aggregate” expected returns on the risky assets  $E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}})$ :

$$E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) = \Theta \Omega_a \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i(\tilde{\mathbf{r}})$$

## 3.2 Equilibrium CAPM

- **Market Portfolio:**

- We define the random return  $\tilde{r}_m$  on the market

$$\tilde{W}_m := \sum_{i=1}^I \tilde{W}_i = W_{m0}(1 + \tilde{r}_m) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \tilde{r}_m = \frac{\tilde{W}_m}{W_{m0}} - 1$$

- In terms of aggregate wealth proportions

$$\tilde{r}_m := r_f + \mathbf{w}_a^\top (\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1})$$

- the aggregate ‘consensus’ variance belief:

$$\sigma_{a,m}^2 := \mathbf{w}_a^\top \Omega_a \mathbf{w}_a$$

- Then the aggregate expected market return

$$E_a(\tilde{r}_m) := r_f + \mathbf{w}_a^\top (E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1})$$

- Aggregate variance of market portfolio becomes

$$\sigma_{a,m}^2 = \frac{1}{\Theta W_{m0}} \{ \mathbf{w}_a^\top [E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}] \}$$

## ● Return Relation

- The aggregate expected market risk premium is proportional to the aggregate relative risk aversion of the economy:

$$[E_a(\tilde{r}_m) - r_f] = \Theta W_{m0} \sigma_{a,m}^2$$

- Aggregate excess return

$$\Omega_a \mathbf{w}_a = \frac{1}{\Theta W_{m0}} [E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \cdot \mathbf{1}]$$



- The CAPM Equilibrium relation under the heterogeneous beliefs:

$$[E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}] = \frac{1}{\sigma_{a,m}^2} \Omega_a \mathbf{w}_a [E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_m) - r_f].$$

- **Heterogeneous beta:**

$$\beta_{a,m} = \frac{\Omega_a \mathbf{w}_a}{\sigma_{a,m}^2} = \frac{[E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \Omega_a^{-1} \mathbf{1}}{[E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \Omega_a^{-1} [E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]} [E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

### 3.3 Equilibrium Prices

- Assume that agents have CARA utility  $\Rightarrow \theta_i = \text{constant}$ .
- In this case we obtain explicitly the optimal demands

$$\mathbf{w}_i = \frac{1}{W_0^i} \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i [\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- The equilibrium price

$$\mathbf{p}_0 = \mathbf{Z}^{-1} \sum_{i=1}^I \theta_i^{-1} \Omega_i^{-1} E_i [\tilde{\mathbf{r}} - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

where  $\mathbf{z} := [z_1, z_2, \dots, z_N]^T$  the supply vector and  $\mathbf{Z} := \text{diag}[z_1, z_2, \dots, z_N]$ .

- The betas can also be expressed in terms of market clearing prices:-

$$\beta_{a,m} = \frac{\mathbf{p}_0^\top \mathbf{z}}{\mathbf{p}_0^\top \mathbf{Z} \Omega_a \mathbf{Z} \mathbf{p}_0} \Omega_a \mathbf{Z} \mathbf{p}_0$$

## 4 Heterogeneous CAPM—A Dynamic Model

### 4.1 Market Fractions and Consensus Belief

- Incorporate into a dynamic setup into the CAPM-like return relationships in the static framework.
- Group the  $I$  investors into a finite number of agent-types  $h \in H$ 
  - $I_h, h \in H$ , the number of investors in group  $h$ .
  - $n_h := I_h/I$  the fraction of agents of type  $h$ .
- Supply:  $s := (1/I)z$  the supply of shares per investor.
- Define the “average” risk aversion:  $\theta_a := \left( \sum_{h \in H} n_h \theta_h^{-1} \right)^{-1}$

- The aggregate beliefs can be rewritten,

$$\Omega_a = \theta_a^{-1} \left( \sum_{h \in H} n_h \theta_h^{-1} \Omega_h^{-1} \right)^{-1}$$


$$E_a(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) = \theta_a \Omega_a \sum_{h \in H} n_h \theta_h^{-1} \Omega_h^{-1} E_h(\tilde{\mathbf{r}})$$

- the equilibrium prices are rewritten as

$$p_0 = S^{-1} \sum_{h \in H} n_h \theta_h^{-1} \Omega_h^{-1} [E_h(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

## 4.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs

- Assume one-period ahead utility maximization
- From time  $t$  to time  $t + 1$ .



- Heterogeneous agents' assessments about  $\tilde{r}_{t+1}$  are functions of the information up to time  $t - 1$ .

- For belief-type  $h \in H$

$$\Omega_{h,t} := [\text{Cov}_{h,t}(\tilde{r}_{j,t+1}, \tilde{r}_{k,t+1})] = \Omega_h(\mathbf{r}_{t-1}, \mathbf{r}_{t-2}, \dots)$$

$$E_{h,t}(\tilde{r}_{t+1}) = \mathbf{f}_h(\mathbf{r}_{t-1}, \mathbf{r}_{t-2}, \dots)$$

- Similarly for the aggregate beliefs  $\Omega_{a,t}$  and  $E_{a,t}(\tilde{r}_{t+1})$ .

## 4.3 Dynamic Equilibrium and Beta

- The market clearing **prices** at time  $t$  become

$$\mathbf{p}_t = \mathbf{S}^{-1} \sum_{h \in H} n_h \theta_h^{-1} \Omega_{h,t}^{-1} [\mathbf{E}_{h,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- The realized **returns** can be written

$$\mathbf{r}_t = \mathbf{F}(\mathbf{r}_{t-1}, \mathbf{r}_{t-2}, \dots; \tilde{\mathbf{d}}_t)$$

- The random return on the market portfolio is

$$\tilde{r}_{m,t+1} = \frac{[\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \Omega_{a,t}^{-1} \tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}}{[\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \Omega_{a,t}^{-1} \mathbf{1}}$$

- At the beginning of  $(t, t + 1)$  the aggregate beliefs about returns (based on information up to time  $t - 1$ ) satisfy

$$\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1} = \beta_{a,mt} [\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{m,t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- The “aggregate” beta coefficients are

$$\beta_{a,mt} = \frac{[\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \boldsymbol{\Omega}_{a,t}^{-1} \mathbf{1}}{[\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]^\top \boldsymbol{\Omega}_{a,t}^{-1} [\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]} [\mathbf{E}_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}]$$

- The “aggregate” betas are time varying due to time varying beliefs about both the second moment and the first moment of the returns distribution.



## 5 An example

- Consider a specific example of interaction of different beliefs types
- Two types of agents, *fundamentalists*, and *trend followers*.
  - **Fundamentalists:**

$$E_{f,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) = \rho_f, \quad \Omega_{f,t} = \bar{\Omega}_f.$$

- **Trend Followers:**

$$E_{c,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) = \rho_c + \gamma(\mathbf{r}_{t-1} - \mathbf{u}_{t-1}),$$

$$\mathbf{u}_{t-1} = \delta \mathbf{u}_{t-2} + (1 - \delta) \mathbf{r}_{t-1}$$

$$\Omega_{c,t} = \bar{\Omega}_c + \lambda \mathbf{V}_{t-1},$$

$$\mathbf{V}_{t-1} = \delta \mathbf{V}_{t-2} + \delta(1 - \delta)(\mathbf{r}_{t-1} - \mathbf{u}_{t-2})(\mathbf{r}_{t-1} - \mathbf{u}_{t-2})^\top$$

- In addition, we consider - *noise traders* - whose demand for each risky asset is an exogenous random disturbance.
- $\theta_f$  and  $\theta_c$  the risk aversion coefficients of the two agent-types
- $n_f$  and  $n_c = 1 - n_f$  their market fractions
- $\theta_a = \left( n_f \theta_f^{-1} + n_c \theta_c^{-1} \right)^{-1}$  the average risk aversion.
- The aggregate variances/covariances and expected excess returns are given, by

$$\Omega_{a,t} = \left( \frac{n_f}{\theta_f} + \frac{n_c}{\theta_c} \right) \left( \frac{n_f}{\theta_f} \overline{\Omega}_f^{-1} + \frac{n_c}{\theta_c} \Omega_{c,t}^{-1} \right)^{-1}$$

$$E_{a,t}(\tilde{r}_{t+1}) = \theta_a \Omega_{a,t} \left[ \frac{n_f}{\theta_f} \overline{\Omega}_f^{-1} E_{f,t}(\tilde{r}_{t+1}) + \frac{n_c}{\theta_c} \Omega_{c,t}^{-1} E_{c,t}(\tilde{r}_{t+1}) \right]$$

- The dynamic model becomes the noisy nonlinear dynamical system

$$\mathbf{p}_t = \mathbf{S}^{-1} \left\{ \frac{n_f}{\theta_f} \bar{\Omega}_f^{-1} \rho_f + \frac{n_c}{\theta_c} \Omega_{c,t}^{-1} [\rho_c + \gamma(\mathbf{r}_{t-1} - \mathbf{u}_{t-1})] - \left( \frac{n_f}{\theta_f} \bar{\Omega}_f^{-1} + \frac{n_c}{\theta_c} \Omega_{c,t}^{-1} \right) r_f \mathbf{1} \right\}$$

$$\mathbf{r}_t = \mathbf{P}_{t-1}^{-1} (\mathbf{p}_t + \tilde{\mathbf{d}}_t) - \mathbf{1}$$

where

$$\mathbf{P}_{t-1} = \text{diag}(p_{1,t-1}, p_{2,t-1}, \dots, p_{N,t-1}).$$

- The effect of noise traders:

- The risky asset demand from the noise traders is described by the random vector

$$\tilde{\xi}_t := [\tilde{\xi}_{1,t}, \tilde{\xi}_{2,t}, \dots, \tilde{\xi}_{N,t}]^\top, \tilde{\xi}_{j,t}$$

- \* i.i.d. with  $E(\tilde{\xi}_{j,t}) = 0$ ,

- \*  $Var(\tilde{\xi}_{j,t}) = q^2 s_j^2$ ,

- \*  $E(\tilde{\xi}_{j,t}, \tilde{\xi}_{k,t}) = 0, j, k = 1, 2, \dots, N$ .

- \*  $\tilde{\Xi}_t := diag(\tilde{\xi}_{1,t}, \tilde{\xi}_{2,t}, \dots, \tilde{\xi}_{N,t})$ .

- The market clearing conditions in the presence of noise traders:-

$$\theta_a^{-1} \Omega_{a,t}^{-1} [E_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}] + \tilde{\Xi}_t \mathbf{p}_t = \mathbf{S} \mathbf{p}_t$$

- The market clearing prices thus become

$$\mathbf{p}_t = (\mathbf{S} - \tilde{\Xi}_t)^{-1} \theta_a^{-1} \Omega_{a,t}^{-1} [E_{a,t}(\tilde{\mathbf{r}}_{t+1}) - r_f \mathbf{1}] \quad (5.1)$$

- Note that the introduction of noise traders is formally equivalent to assuming a noisy supply vector  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_t = \mathbf{s} - \tilde{\xi}_t$ .

## 6 Some numerical experiments

- Constant homogeneous beliefs: *fundamentalists* (and *noise traders*)
- Time-varying heterogeneous beliefs about expected returns: *fundamentalists*, *trend followers* (and *noise traders*)
- Role of ‘market fraction’
- Effect of updating second moment beliefs
- Focus on
  - ‘Market portfolio’ weights
  - Asset returns and market return (realized)
  - Beta coefficients
  - Market price of risk (in terms of aggregate ‘consensus’ beliefs)

3 risky assets  
one risk-free asset

Base parameter selection

$$\rho_f = \rho_c = [9\% \quad 11\% \quad 15\%]'$$

$$\gamma = 0.05, \quad \delta = 0.95, \quad \lambda = 0$$

$$\theta_f = \theta_c = 1$$


$$\bar{\Omega}_f = \bar{\Omega}_c = \begin{bmatrix} 0.16^2 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0.20^2 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0.24^2 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\bar{d} = [210 \quad 220 \quad 310]'$$





dividend st.dev.: 10% of average dividend

$$r_f = 3\%$$

$$s = [0.001 \quad 0.001 \quad 0.001]'$$







- **Fundamentalists with constant beliefs - no noise traders**  
(noise from dividend process)









- Fundamentalists with constant beliefs - noise traders**  
 (noise trading st.dev.: 1% of supply)  
 (noise from dividend process and noise trading)



- Fundamentalists with constant beliefs - noise traders**  
 (noise trading st.dev.: 5% of supply)  
 (noise from dividend process and noise trading)




- **Noisy returns feed back into aggregate beliefs and beta coefficients**

20% trend followers with time varying expectations (extrapolated from past returns)

80% fundamentalists with constant beliefs, noise traders

(noise trading st.dev.= 5% of supply)







- **Noisy returns feed back into aggregate beliefs and beta coefficients**

40% trend followers with time varying expectations (extrapolated from past returns)

60% fundamentalists with constant beliefs, noise traders

(noise trading st.dev.= 5% of supply)







- **Noisy returns feed back into aggregate beliefs and beta coefficients**

75% trend followers with time varying expectations (extrapolated from past returns)

25% fundamentalists with constant beliefs,


noise traders (noise trading st.dev.= 5% of supply)



- **Effect of stronger trend extrapolation ( $\gamma = 0.065$ )**

75% trend followers, 25% fundamentalists


(noise trading st.dev.= 5% of supply)






- **Effect of updating second moment beliefs**

75% trend followers, 25% fundamentalists,  
 strong trend extrapolation and noise trading  
 ( $\gamma = 0.0625$ , noise trading st.dev.= 5% of supply).

No updating of second moment beliefs ( $\lambda = 0$ )



Second moment beliefs updated based on historical variances/ covariances ( $\lambda=0.25$ )



## 7 Conclusion

- Formulate a heterogeneous agent CAPM
- Rediscovered - in a different notation - some early neglected work of Lintner
- Set up a dynamic framework that incorporates expectations feedback
- Time varying beta driven by expectations feedback
- Looked at the simple fundamentalists/ trend followers/ noise traders set-up as one example of an updating scheme
- Future work will focus on
  - Further simulations to incorporate correlation structure
  - Broader class of agent types
  - Properties of the time-variation of beta